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Dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia stated that, under
the Due Process Clause, if an asserted liberty is a "fundamental right," it
triggers "strict scrutiny" that almost automatically invalidates any statute
restricting that liberty. For strict scrutiny requires that the challenged
statute, to be upheld, must further a "compelling governmental interest"
and must be "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to doing so. Scalia also
wrote that if an asserted liberty is not a fundamental right, it is merely a
"liberty interest" that triggers rational basis scrutiny that is so deferential
that the Court all but automatically upholds the statute in question. For
deferential rational basis scrutiny requires merely that the challenged
statute, to be valid, must further a "legitimate governmental interest" and
need only be "rationally related" to doing so.1
Lawrence deviated from this regime. The Court did not hold that
Reproduced by permission of the publisher from ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES by James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright C 2013 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College.
** Professor James E. Fleming gave the .Aaron Lecture at Dartmouth College on October 31,
2013. He based his lecture on Chapter 9 of his recent book, Ordered Liberty: Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues (with Linda C. McClain). He is the Honorable Frank R. Kenison
Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate Dean of Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law at
Boston University School of Law. He has also authored Securing Constitutional Democracy: The
Case of Autonomy (University of Chicago Press, 2006), Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic
Questions (Oxford University Press, 2007), and American Constitutional Interpretation (4th ed.,
Foundation Press, 2008). He also is to be co-author of the fifth edition of Tort and Accident Law:
Cases and Materials. From 2008 to 2011, Professor Fleming was Editor of NOMOS, the annual
book of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. Professor Fleming received his
J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton
University. He practiced litigation at Cravath, Swaine & Moore before becoming a law professor.
During the 1999-2000 year, he was a Faculty Fellow in Ethics in the Harvard University Center
for Ethics and the Professions. Professor Fleming can be reached at jfleminggbu.edu.
539 U.S. 558, 593-594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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homosexuals' right to autonomy was a fundamental right requiring strict
scrutiny. Nor did it hold that their right was merely a liberty interest calling
for highly deferential rational basis scrutiny. Instead, the Court applied an
intermediate standard-what we call "rational basis scrutiny with bite"and struck down the statute forbidding same-sex sexual conduct.
Consequently, Scalia cried foul, chastising the Court for not following the
rigid two-tier framework that all but automatically decides rights questions
one way or the other.2 In equal protection cases, Scalia has cried foul
because strict scrutiny for affirmative action plans has not been "fatal in
fact" but has required judgment.3 In due process cases, he has cried foul
because rational basis scrutiny for laws forbidding same- sex sexual
conduct has not been nonexistent in fact. In both domains, and in the
application of both tiers, he has called for absolute, automatic decisions that
do not require judgment. Such a jurisprudence manifests both the illusion
of absoluteness and the impoverishment of judgment.
We shall expose the myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause. Scalia's formulation of the framework for
substantive due process sounds familiar and uncontroversial. Indeed, you'll
find this formulation in leading treatises and commercial outlines because
these sources seek neat, rigidly maintained frameworks with clearly
delineated tiers of analysis. Yet we show that the only substantive due
process case ever to recognize a fundamental right implicating strict
scrutiny-requiring that the statute further a compelling governmental
interest and be necessary to doing so-was Roe v. Wade.4 And we point out
that those aspects of Roe were overruled in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,
which pointedly avoided calling the right of a woman to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy a "fundamental right" and substituted an "undue
burden" standard for strict scrutiny.5 Going through due process cases
protecting liberty and autonomy-from Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) through
Casey (1992) and Lawrence (2003)-we show that due process
jurisprudence is not absolutist nor does it reflect an impoverishment of
judgment. None of these cases applies the framework that Scalia
propounds. To the contrary, these cases reflect what Casey and Justice
Harlan called "reasoned judgment" concerning our "rational continuum" of
"ordered liberty." 6 Indeed, they have involved judgment of the very sort
that Glendon calls for and that Scalia would banish. The constitutional
liberalism developed in our book does not seek to protect rights absolutely
or to avoid judgment in interpreting rights. Instead, it justifies such
2 Id., 593-594.
3 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 505 U.S. 833, 847, 876 (1992).
6 Id., 848-849; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
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reasoned judgment, which protects important rights stringently but does not
preclude government from encouraging responsibility or inculcating civic
virtues.
Whence derives the myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause? How did it take hold in our constitutional
culture despite lacking a firm footing in the cases protecting liberty or
autonomy under that clause? This myth has been propounded and
perpetuated mostly by opponents of substantive due process like Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist. As stated previously, it has not been put forward
in cases recognizing asserted liberties as protected under the Due Process
Clause (besides Roe, itself repudiated in this respect in Casey). Instead,
opponents of substantive due process have advanced the myth of strict
scrutiny for fundamental rights in opinions refusing to recognize asserted
rights. Examples include Justice White's majority opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick, rejecting a right of homosexuals to sexual privacy (Bowers was
overruled in Lawrence, hence provoking Scalia's rage in dissent); Scalia's
plurality opinion in Michael H v. Gerald D., rejecting a right of unwed
fathers to visit their biological children;8 Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, rejecting a right to die including physicianassisted suicide; 9 and, most pointedly, Scalia's dissent in Lawrence,
objecting to the Court's protection of a right of homosexuals to sexual
privacy or autonomy. We will focus on the latter two.
These opponents of substantive due process perpetuate the myth in
order to narrow the interpretation of the Due Process Clause, to make it
harder to justify protecting rights under it. Somehow, the defenders of
substantive due process have fallen for the myth and been enlisted in
perpetuating it. We suppose that they have been willing participants, not
because they want to make it hard to protect rights of privacy or autonomy,
but instead because they want stringent protection for rights of privacy or
autonomy under the Due Process Clause. After all, liberal constitutional
theorists who defend substantive due process typically love talk of "taking
rights seriously," and it is no surprise that they might think that the best
way to take rights seriously is to declare them to be "fundamental rights"
and to subject restrictions upon or regulations of them to "strict scrutiny."
Indeed, typically in constitutional law, what drives jurists and scholars to
impose or argue for a requirement of strict scrutiny is a desire stringently to
protect the right in question, as is the case with the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause, two main areas of strict scrutiny. We do not,
for example, trust government when it restricts freedom of speech on the
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8491 U.S. 110 (1989).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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basis of the content of ideas, and we are suspicious of government when it
passes laws reflecting racial prejudice. In substantive due process, by
contrast, what typically drives jurists like Scalia and Rehnquist to argue for
the requirement of strict scrutiny is a desire narrowly to limit the
recognition and protection of rights of liberty or autonomy.
Indeed, the twofold result of Scalia's and Rehnquist's myth is to
make it harder to recognize rights under the Due Process Clause and then to
make all cases recognizing rights but not tracking this doctrinal template of
strict scrutiny-which is to say all cases protecting rights under substantive
due process (besides Roe)-seem problematic, messy, and unrigorous.
Every time the Court does not use the formulations "fundamental right,"
"strict scrutiny," "compelling," and "necessary," people say that something
illegitimate is going on. Even liberal proponents of substantive due process
are sometimes complicit in perpetuating the myth.'o

If the familiar framework of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
is a myth, what framework (or standards) has the Court actually applied?
Put another way, what framework best fits and justifies the line of cases
actually protecting substantive liberties under the Due Process Clause? We
have already given away the answer: Harlan's famous conception of the
Due Process inquiry advanced in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman. We offer
interpretations of Harlan's conception that bring out how well it fits and
justifies the cases over and against Scalia's and Rehnquist's conception
propounding the myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights. And we
show that the cases have not protected rights absolutely so as to preclude
government from encouraging responsibility or inculcating civic virtues in
the ways prescribed by our constitutional liberalism.
I.

REASONED JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE RATIONAL CONTINUUM OF
ORDERED LIBERTY

The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in
Casey embraced Justice Harlan's conception of the Due Process inquiry as
put forward in dissent in Poe. It quoted the following two passages from
Harlan:
10 Michael C. Dorf with Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Law (New York:Oxford University
Press, 2011), 209. Ultimately, after speaking of the Court's "doctrinal meanderings," they put the
matter rightly: "Nonetheless, taking a bird's eye, rather than a worm's eye, view of the topic, we
can see that the Court will apply some form of heightened scrutiny to laws that infringe the
freedom of competent adults to make important decisions about family formation, child-rearing,
and bodily autonomy."
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Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code.
The best that can be said is that.. .it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect
for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of
necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been
one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided
speculation might take them. The balance.. .is the balance
struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well
as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision
which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise
terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,...and
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment."
Interpreting these passages, the joint opinion in Casey added:
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the
Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.
11Poe, 542, 543.
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Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple
rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state
policy choices with which we disagree; yet neither does it
permit us to shrink from the duties of our office.' 2

We shall distill five characteristics of Harlan's substantive due
process jurisprudence, in contradistinction from the hankerings seen in
Scalia's and Rehnquist's myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause. First, Harlan conceives liberty as a "rational
continuum" of "ordered liberty," not a list of fundamental rights or isolated
points pricked out in the text of the Constitution. It is an abstract concept
(as Casey put it, "ideas and aspirations" 13), not a code of concrete, specific
enumerated rights. Second, he conceives interpretation of abstract
commitments like liberty as a "rational process" of "reasoned judgment,"
not a quest for a formula, code, or bright-line framework to avoid
judgment. Third, applying these conceptions of liberty and interpretation
yields a rational continuum of judgmental responses, not a rigidly
maintained two-tier framework. ourth, and relatedly, doing so requires
judgment about the balance between liberty and order ("ordered liberty")
and uses common-law constitutionlist reasoning by analogy from one case
to the next, as opposed to making decisions by automatically invalidating
or automatically upholding challenged legislation. Fifth, while Harlan
agrees with Scalia that judgments about liberties must be grounded in
history and tradition, Harlan unlike Scalia conceives tradition as a "living
thing" or evolving contemporary consensus, not hidebound historical
practices as of the time the Due Process Clause was ratified (in 1868). 14
If the Supreme Court were to have applied Harlan's conception of
the Due Process inquiry, what would our substantive due process
jurisprudence look like? Instead of having two rigidly maintained tiersstrict scrutiny and deferential rational basis scrutiny-we would have a
spectrum of standards or continuum of judgmental responses. That is, this
jurisprudence would look basically the very way it looks today! To preview
our findings, see the figure below for the spectrum of standards or
continuum of judgmental responses we will see in the substantive due
process cases. We have ordered them from the most stringent review to the
most lenient or deferential review.
12 Casey,

849.

13 Id., 901.
14 Contrast

Poe, 542 (Harlan's view of tradition as a "living thing") with Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia's view of tradition as concrete historical practices embodied in the
common law and statute books as of 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).
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i

Strict scrutiny
Roe; Loving (EP Clause)

Undue burden standard
Casey

{"Means may not sweep unnecessarily broadly"
Griswold

Intermediate scrutiny
Moore; Craig (EP Clause)

{Rational basis scrutiny with "bite"
Lawrence; Romer (EP Clause); Meyer; Pierce

tBalancing of liberty interest against state interest
Deferential rational basis scrutiny

Cruzan

Bowers; Michael H.; Glucksberg

Throughout, we shall be inquiring which framework for the Due Process
inquiry-that of Scalia/Rehnquist or that of Harlan-better fits and
justifies the cases. We will conclude that Harlan's framework can fit and
justify all of the cases protecting rights under the Due Process Clause, and
that that of Scalia and Rehnquist can fit and justify none of them.

III. SCALIA'S DISSENT IN LA WRENCE

We are now in a position to assess Scalia's dissent in Lawrence,
with which this chapter opened. Again, Scalia says that the Court's
established framework for the Due Process Clause has two rigidly policed,
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dichotomous tiers: either fundamental right, triggering strict scrutiny, or
mere liberty interest, triggering deferential rational basis scrutiny." As
stated, Scalia claims that only "fundamental rights" get greater protection
than that afforded under deferential rational basis scrutiny. What is more,
White in Bowers had offered the two famous phrases from Palko and
Moore- "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition"-as alternative formulations for
deciding whether an asserted liberty was protected-as if you just had to
satisfy one or the other.16 By contrast, Scalia in dissent in Lawrence offers
them as independent requirements-and claims that you have to satisfy
both. He claims that an asserted liberty has to be both implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition. '7
Whereas Bowers, much like Glucksberg, spoke of "heightened"
scrutiny but did not specify a framework of what that heightened scrutiny
would consist of, Scalia speaks of "strict" scrutiny and says that the
established framework is to require a compelling governmental interest and
a necessary relationship between the statute and that interest. 8 Bowers,
Glucksberg, and Scalia's dissent in Lawrence contemplate a rigid two-tier
framework: if the Court is not prepared to declare an asserted liberty a
"fundamental right" triggering heightened or strict scrutiny, it falls back on
deferential rational basis scrutiny. For them, there is nothing in betweennotwithstanding all of the cases that have gone before and which we have
shown to lie in between. We have shown this framework to be false
through and through, a myth of Scalia's and Rehnquist's making.
Scalia also refers to the Court's method in Lawrence-which we
call rational basis scrutiny with "bite"-as "unheard of."1 9 To say that an
approach is "unheard of' is one of Scalia's favorite put-downs. In Casey,
he referred to the joint opinion's conception of "reasoned judgment" as
unheard of, even though it was a well-known and much celebrated
approach famously propounded by Justice Harlan. The joint opinion there
claimed to be following the Court's "established method" and we have
shown that it can account for the cases protecting liberties under the Due
Process Clause. That was not enough to stop Scalia from haughtily
asserting that this was a "new" method never heard of before that day.20
Let's address Scalia's claim that Kennedy's approach to
scrutinizing the Texas law in Lawrence was "unheard of" It is
1 Lawrence, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16Bowers, 191-192.
1 Lawrence, 596.
18Id., 593.
1' Id., 586.

20 Casey, 1000 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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demonstrably false in two important respects. For one thing, Kennedy's
method closely resembles Harlan's well-known framework (as shown
above). For another, Kennedy's method closely resembles Kennedy's own
approach, under the Equal Protection Clause, to measures reflecting animus
against gays and lesbians in Romer.21 And let's not forget that Scalia there
objected to this very approach as unheard of.2 2 In Romer, instead of
applying strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or deferential rational basis
scrutiny, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny with "bite"-putting some
teeth into its scrutiny of both the legitimacy of the end and the fit between
means and end. Lawrence is not the first case in which the Court has
adapted an analysis in the Equal Protection Clause context to the Due
Process Clause context. And that analysis was already familiar in the Equal
Protection Clause context from cases like City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center and U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, which had
looked askance at laws reflecting "animosity" toward, or a "bare desire to
harm," a "politically unpopular group" without applying "strict scrutiny" to
them.23
We have analogous situations regarding gays and lesbians in
relation to the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. In
Romer, the Court was not about to say that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation should be recognized as a suspect classification
triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Nor, on the
other hand, was it about to say that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should be subjected to merely deferential rational basis scrutiny
(just like regulations discriminating against opticians in Williamson).
Similarly, in Lawrence, the Court was not about to say that the right of
gays and lesbians to sexual autonomy is a fundamental right triggering
strict scrutiny. (In fact, the joint opinion in Casey wouldn't even any longer
say that the right to abortion is a "fundamental right.") Nor, on the other
hand, was it about to say that laws criminalizing homosexual sexual
intimacy should be subjected to merely deferential rational basis scrutiny
(just like regulations of opticians in Williamson). And so, in Romer under
the Equal Protection Clause as well as in Lawrence under the Due Process
Clause, the Court has eschewed rigorously policing frameworks of three
tiers or two tiers and instead applied rational basis scrutiny with "bite"; not
as stringent as strict scrutiny and not as lenient as deferential rational basis
scrutiny. In Romer, the Court put some bite into its scrutiny of the asserted
legitimate governmental interest: whereas Bowers presumed that the
preservation of traditional sexual morality was a legitimate governmental
21

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-635 (1996).

22 Id., 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Romer, 634-635 (citing U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973));
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-447 (1985) (also citing Moreno).
23
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interest,24 Romer saw "animosity" toward a "politically unpopular group"
and held this not to be a legitimate governmental interest.25 In Romer, the
Court also put some teeth into its analysis of the fit between the means and
the end.26 Lawrence applies a similar analysis with "bite."27 And so,
contrary to Scalia, the level of scrutiny in Lawrence had been heard of in
Romer.

V.

DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF STRICT SCRUTINY FOR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS

To recapitulate: Scalia and Rehnquist have propounded the myth of
strict scrutiny for fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause to make
it harder to protect liberties. For Scalia and Rehnquist (not to mention
White in Bowers), the ideal state of affairs would be to abolish substantive
due process altogether, to overrule all of the precedents protecting
substantive liberties under the Due Process Clause and, going forward, to
protect no such substantive liberties. But they do not have the votes to
accomplish their ideal state of affairs. For Scalia and Rehnquist (along with
White), the second-best state of affairs is to formulate a framework that
will narrow the precedents, drain them of generative vitality, and make it
difficult if not impossible to protect "new" liberties under the Due Process
Clause and make it easy to uphold laws restricting liberty.
It might seem that the fact that the cases have not followed this
framework would be a strike against the framework. That is, when one
offers a framework to account for an area of doctrine, ordinarily one seeks
to show that it fits and justifies the cases. If the framework doesn't fit and
justify the cases, that suggests that the framework is inadequate. But Scalia
and Rehnquist treat the fact that the cases have not followed this
framework as a strike against the cases! They propound the myth of strict
scrutiny for fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause, even though
none of the cases protecting liberties under the Due Process Clause have
conformed to that framework (besides Roe, itself repudiated in this respect
in Casey). Then they criticize those cases for failing to follow the
framework. They criticize the cases, accordingly, as illegitimate and as a
mess suggesting the inherent unruliness, incoherence, and illegitimacy of
the whole undertaking. Again, instead of acknowledging, from the fact that
the cases don't fit the framework, that the framework is inadequate, Scalia
can criticize the cases for not following the framework. Thus, Scalia and
24

Bowers, 196.
25Romer, 634.
26 Id., 635.

27See Lawrence, 578.
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Rehnquist try to have it both ways: propound a new framework to shut
down the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause and then
criticize the precedents for failing rigorously to have followed that
framework! Tellingly, opinions by White, Scalia, and Rehnquist (in
Bowers, Michael H., Glucksberg, and dissent in Bowers) proclaim that this
is the established framework and cite one another (cases denying protection
of liberties) in support of this claim, but they do not-and cannot-cite
cases actually protecting rights as supporting this framework.
Notwithstanding the myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause and the absoluteness critique, the cases
protecting basic liberties under the Due Process Clause reflect what Casey
and Justice Harlan called "reasoned judgment" concerning our "rational
continuum" of "ordered liberty." 2 8 The cases themselves dispel any illusion
of absoluteness concerning rights of privacy or autonomy and avoid the
impoverishment of judgment that Scalia seeks and Glendon decries. Our
constitutional liberalism justifies such reasoned judgment, protecting
important rights stringently but not precluding government from
encouraging responsibility or inculcating civic virtues. It enables us to
pursue ordered liberty through taking rights, responsibilities, and virtues
seriously.

28Poe, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("rational continuum"); Casey, at 849 ("reasoned judgment").

